Sunday, December 2, 2018

INTERIOR DESIGN INDUSTRY - New Study Available

I just completed a study of the U.S.  Interior Design industry- here is a description of the study contents.

Please contact me if you are interested in learning more about it, or purchasing a copy.





Thursday, April 5, 2018

SIZE OF BATHROOMS IN NEW US HOMES

We just published a major research study that provides actual data on the size of each of the bathrooms in newly-built U.S. homes. The study has been released in two separate sections, one providing bathroom sizes at a national level. The second study cover similar data but for each of the 9 U.S. regions.

Each of the two studies is priced at $2,499, but both can be purchased at a 15% discount for $4,250.
Here are the contents of the national study:




Sunday, January 8, 2017

WORKERS & NON-WORKERS

Almost two years ago I initiated this blog with a brief piece on the fact that many Americans appear to be less willing to join the labor force. That is, the article dealt with what is commonly referred as the declining labor force participation rate. I thought that today, when I am trying to revive my blog, it would be interesting to revisit that theme. Hopefully, my (real) work commitments will allow me more free time to continue writing this blog in the future, since I truly enjoy writing it, and that I hope readers find it useful.

Labor Participation Rates
A lot has been written lately about the declining labor participation rates in the U.S. That is, the percentage of the population of working age, 16 years and older, who are either working or looking actively for a job. Most of the time, however, the commentary just focuses on the overall rate and, more troublesome, it is stated with the intent of making a political point.

The fact is that, yes, the participation rate is falling but the cause is not necessarily misguided economic policies or that we are becoming lazier. Although, we must admit, economic policies may have had a negative impact.

The chart to the right displays the average participation rate, by decade, since the 1950s. This is the data that we commonly see, although usually not grouped by decade as I've done here.
We can clearly see that the rate rose from the 1960s to peak sometime in the 90s, and it has  been declining since then. For the current decade it has averaged 63.4%, with the latest reading in December of last year at 62.7%. This is a significant drop from the 1990s average of 66.7%.
The question that obviously arises is what is behind this decline? I try to provide some answers here.

Why the drop in participation rates?

The first place to look is participation rates according to age. And this is where we begin to get an explanation for the falling rates. The chart nearby shows trends in participation rates for the major age groups, going back to 1951.
The four lines at the top of the chart, representing the rates for the four age groups in the 25 to 54 years old bracket, show that the participation rate generally peaked in the late 80s or early 90s. Since that time the rates for the four age groups, within the 25-54 bracket, have been falling. The decline has been gradual for those aged 25-34, 35-44 and 45-54 years, but more rapidly for the younger 20-24 year olds.
The latter group, 20-24 year olds, has seen a decline of nearly 10 percentage points since the late 1980s. The other three groups have declined by a much smaller percent, they are between three and four percentage points below their corresponding peak rate.

The biggest declines are in the 16-19 year old group. Although the data series for younger people begins in 1976, it's evident that participation among this group peaked early in August 1978. The rate fell gradually between 1978 and the end of the century, but still a 10-point drop, only to drop precipitously from the beginning of this century. Labor participation among 16-19 year olds stands currently at 34.8%, nearly 25 percentage points below what is was in 1978. Further, as implied above, fifteen of those twenty percentage points have been lost since 2000. Naturally an issue that needs to be explained is why this sharp drop occurred among our youngest working-age population.

Changing Gender Roles
A disturbing phenomenon is the declining trend in male participation in the work force. Back in the 1950s, a very large proportion of males were active in the labor force, particularly in comparison to females. For 1951, for instance, the male labor force participation was 86.5% while only 34.6% of females were in the labor force. Males were more than twice as active in the labor force as females.

If we fast forward to today, we find the male rate is 69%, that is 15 percentage points lower than in 1951. In contrast, females started joining the labor force in droves beginning the 1960s so that today we find that nearly 57% of females are in the labor force- this is a gain of more than 20 percentage points.
The chart to the right vividly illustrates these opposing trends. This secular decline in male participation provides a partial, albeit small, explanation for the overall losses in the U.S. overall participation rate.

People Who Don't Join the Labor Force

As population grows or people age, a number of them naturally opt to either leave the labor force or not join it altogether. It is expected that as people get older the appeal or necessity of work declines. Also, people at different ages may decide to leave the labor force for a variety of reasons, such as dads who decide to stay home to take care of children or simply be the principal homemaker. In fact, the Pew Research Center found that between 1989 and 2012 two million males stayed home taking care of their kids- an increase of nearly one million in 23 years (http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2014/06/05/growing-number-of-dads-home-with-the-kids/)


But who are these people?
Our investigations show that over the last 30 years, that is since 1986, working age population has increased by 72.8 million and the labor force by a smaller 31.5 million. The difference, 27.4 million, represent the additional number of people who were not in the labor force by 2016.

Looking deeper into the data we find that most of the decline is due to the aging of population. In fact,  42% of the decline since 1986 is due to an increase in the number of people who are 65 years or older. And a further 15% came from people in the 55 to 64 years group.
Thus, a reasonable explanation for the lower participation rate is demographic. It is simply disingenuous to lay the blame on people being lazier today or perhaps that government programs are the principal cause of the labor force decline.
From the chart above, showing participation rate trends by age group, we can easily see that as a person ages and moves from one age group to an older one, his or her participation rate will change. For instance, if nothing changes but time passes by a year, we will automatically see a drop in the participation rate. People who are in the 55-64 group who move to the 65-plus group will see their participation drop from 64.3% to the 19.5% of the older group.

Older People More Active
The interesting thing is that labor participation rates among the older population groups has actually increased. For the 55 to 64 year old group, the rate peaked in 2009 at 65.7%, just a shade higher of what it is today (64.3%.) But the most interesting one may be the oldest group. The participation rate for people aged 65 years or older had been declining until the mid-80s, when it stabilized roughy around 12%.  It turned around from the beginning of the century, and it has been rising to its current rate of nearly 20%. Their higher participation rate is ameliorating the decline somewhat.

Two factors may explain the rising rate among the older groups. One is that people are living longer and, thus, many are opting to continue working because of the satisfaction that work provides for them. Another reason, and more compelling, is that some people don't have sufficient income to enable them to retire comfortably. This could be either because their financial situation worsened as a consequence of the 2008-09 economic recession, when many people were devastated financially, or they did not plan properly for retirement.



Friday, February 5, 2016

IT'S NOT WHAT THEY SAY, IT'S WHAT THEY DO

Do presidential candidates deliver on what they promise during a campaign once they are elected? This is a question that many people this year, when we are in the middle of another campaign, are probably skeptically answering with a resounding no. There is indeed a high likelihood that most people dismiss the promises made by candidates, although there could be a general expectation that at some fundamental level the candidate may deliver on the underlying spirit of his or her promises.

Although I do not attempt to explore this question here, I will deal with a related issue. That is examine the presidential priorities as revealed in the patterns of spending the Federal budget. I will focus my analysis on the volume of Federal government expenditures under each U.S. president going back to the beginning of the Second World War in 1940.

Federal Spending Always Increases...No Surprise
Let's start with total spending by the Federal government, illustrated by the blue line in the chart to the right. The vertical lines reflect each successive president whose name is identified at the top. In a couple of cases I have combined two presidents and treat them as one, Kennedy/Johnson and Nixon/Ford, since the second president of the pair came to office by accident and more or less followed the policies of the rightfully elected preceding president (although Johnson won a rightful term on his own and may have gone much farther than Kennedy ever intended or even thought of going). Also, the breaks denoted by the vertical lines are placed one year after each individual takes office- I did this because for all practical purposes Federal spending during the first few months of a new president's term, perhaps up to a year, has been determined to a great extent by the budget adopted by the previous president. Finally, the numbers in the chart underneath each president's name reflect the difference in spending between the first and the last year of each president's term in office.
A quick inspection of the chart clearly reveals that spending by the Federal government increases steadily year after year, regardless of who is in office. The only periods where we spot a decline are those following a period of excessive spending resulting from a war (WWII in the 1940s, Korean war in the 1950s, and the Afghanistan/Irak wars in the early 2000s.) Thus, one thing we can be sure of is that Federal spending will continue to increase. Moreover, the increase in spending incurred by each successive president is higher than that of the previous office holder. In only two instances we can see a smaller increase; one is during Bush I (Bush Papa) when the $238 billion increase in spending at the end of his term was smaller than the previous president's (Reagan)- but Bush I was in office only four years, compared to Reagan's eight years. The second one is under Obama, whose increase in the rate of spending is less than his predecessor's because Bush II courageously or foolishly, take your pick, engaged in two wars, in Afghanistan and Irak. Although, as we will see below, defense spending under Obama is still double what it was at the beginning of the Bush II term.


The Change in Spending Always Increases Too
An alternative way of viewing this trend in Federal spending is to look at the change in spending relative to total Federal spending, that is, as a percentage of total Federal spending for the final year. For instance, Reagan's change in spending is almost 75% higher than his predecessor's, that is Carter; but in relative terms we can see that both are very close as percentages of total spending\- 69% for Reagan versus 66% for Carter. Similarly, we can see that Bush II's increase of nearly $1.7 trillion dwarfs the spending of all other presidents. However, this huge increase becomes in relative terms second to the spending committed by Nixon/Ford- 89% for Bush II against 125% for the Nixon/Ford duo. Note that by insisting on a relative comparison I am not suggesting that we should accept those large increases laying down.


Does Spending Reveal the Priorities of Presidents?
Aside from the overall increase in spending, that every president achieves regardless of party or political tendencies, we can get a clearer view of the presidents tendencies and preferences by analyzing the way they allocate funds among the various departments or functions.
The chart to the right ranks the changes in spending on the major government functions; again we are comparing changes in spending from beginning to end of each president's term. For ease of visual interpretation we have color-coded the principal functions. Note that some of the cells at the bottom have a red arrow- the arrows denote areas where spending actually drops under the corresponding president- Nixon/Ford take the prize for downplaying science.
We can see how increases in Defense spending loom large for many presidents; Truman and the Korean war, JFK/LBJ for the Vietnam war, Carter flip-flopping on defense (he started cutting defense spending but towards the end of his term he actually increased it.) Also Reagan and the successful military build-up that drove the Soviet Union out of business, although in some quarters there is nostalgia for that system (Bernie Sanders?),  and Bush II for the misguided wars. We can also can see how Social Security spending increases are top, or near the top, for most periods. And, as we will see below, they will continue to demand more and more increases in Federal spending as the baby boomers retire in droves.
Medicare is another function that is requiring greater spending every year, unless congress opts for modifying the law, something that is not politically palatable.

Changes in Priorities Over Time
The priorities and plans of an incoming president are normally altered by practical circumstances or unforeseen geopolitical world events. Although in the end Presidents may be able to attain and meet their plans. The bars on each of the nine graphs in the chart at the right, representing the spending shares for every president since FDR, provide a visual image of these shifting priorities. The bar with a percentage number simply identifies the period when that particular function peaked as a share of total federal spending. But we must be careful not to be fooled by these charts and conclude, for instance, that defense spending has declined. Its share of total spending has fallen but, as shown below spending for national defense (some think of it as spending for intrusion into other countries affairs) has increased sharply. One thing is clear though, spending for Social Security, Medicare and Health (that includes Medicaid) has been increasing, and will continue to do so, because of legal committments. The first two primarily to aging population that will increase rapidly over the next few years as the baby boomers retire.

The Relentless Increase in Defense Spending
The chart to the right displays defense spending back to 1940. We can see that in only three presidential terms spending for defense fell, but only temporarily: under Truman, Clinton and Obama. But even in these cases, we can see that spending began to increase towards the end of their presidential term. In the case of Truman the rise was driven by the military reaction to North Korea's invasion of the South Korea. Clinton, who began requesting smaller defense budgets, but reversed course in the middle of his term responding to a number of trouble spots around the world (Somalia, Bosnia, etc.), with his defense spending at the end of his term virtually identical to where he started. Finally, Obama reduced defense spending by removing all forces from Irak and lessening our involvement in Afghanistan, but has increased the budget in the last two years in response to Russia's and Isis' threats (an argument can be said that the first is the result of the famous "reset" with Russia at the beginning of his term, and the second caused by the abandoning Irak without support.)

Mandatory and Discretionary Spending
But something has been happening over the years. As Congress approves more and more laws and regulations that guarantee benefits to segments of the U.S. population, a greater portion of the budget falls into the so-called "mandatory" spending. That is, spending that the Federal government is committed unless Congress specifically obviates it by law- and this hardly every happens. So we see that a really big chunk of the budget, slightly over 70% today, is out of the discretion of the President, he has to spend the funds by the force of law. The chart clearly shows the rise in mandatory spending over the last 50 years or so. The only way that Congress can increase discretionary spending is by changing existing laws, raising taxes further or simply incurring additional debt. The latter is the normally preferred method since it shifts the burden to future taxpayer generations who can't complain about the burden.

What Do We Make of This?
First of all, this analysis confirms and provides factual evidence to what we already knew, that no matter what the political leanings or beliefs of the candidate, spending during his term will increase. Spending rose even under Reagan, the 'government is the problem' president. Yes, you will say, but it was for a good purpose, to bring the Soviet Union to its knees. And indeed that was a good motive; the problem is that there is always a good motive to justify more spending.
Secondly, the larger mandatory spending as a share of total spending increases the likelihood that Congress and the President will simply resort to more debt to fund additional programs. Raising taxes, the more correct alternative because current beneficiaries should carry the burden, is harder to implement because of the re-election consequences for congressmen.

Monday, December 14, 2015

93 MILLION, OR SHOULD IT BE 32 MILLION?

Much has been written lately about the 93 million working-age people in the U.S. who are today neither working nor looking for a job. These millions of people translate into the lowest rate of labor participation since the mid-70s, and even though it had risen to a peak of 67.6% in 1997 the rate has been declining since that year, as can be appreciated in the chart.
The chart shows that the labor participation rate was fairly stable between 1948 and the late 60s, hovering around 60%. Then it began a gradual and steady rise for the following 30 years until it peaked at the above-mentioned rate of 67.6% in 1997, only to fall continuously over the last 18 years. The increase in participation between the 1960s and the 90s is attributed primarily to increases in the female participation rate, as significant numbers of women joined the labor force and obtained jobs. In fact, female participation rose steadily from around 33% in 1948 to a peak of 60.4% in 1997.
 
But back to the 93 million. Often we read articles and hear opinions that, attempting perhaps to make a political point, imply or state directly that these 93 million are unemployed. They say that these people are not in the labor force because they have been shut-out of the market from a lack of employment opportunities. Granted, for some people that may be the case. Frustrated because they can't find employment they stop searching for a job altogether and, thus, are not counted anymore as part of the labor force. However a deeper analysis into the data shows that there are other reasons explaining why there are so many people not in the labor force and why this number will continue to increase in the foreseeable future.

Age Drives Participation in the Labor Force
The primary reason is the change in age structure of the population; that is, the fact that the U.S. population is getting older provides a partial explanation. The chart to the right displays today's population mix by age group (the red bars) compared to what it was 25 years ago in 1990 (the blue bars.) Each bar stands for the percentage of the year's population accounted by each age group. We can see the aging of the population in that the red bars are higher than the blue ones for the older three groups, that is people 45 years and older. This group represents today 52% of the working age population, up from 40% in 1990. Conversely, the under 45 years population fell from 60% in 1990 to today's 48%. Also note that the percentage drops for every bracket under 45 years.

The pie chart conveys a more clear view of the change in mix by age group since 1990. Over the last 25 years, the working-age population rose by 61.7 million persons, to this year's 251 million. Each slice in the pie represents the percent of the total change between 1990 and 2015 for each of the seven age groups. Thus, we can see that the largest change occurred among the 55 to 64 years group with 32% of the total change, or just under 20 million persons. Second in line are the two groups that bracket the 55-64 years one, each with 28% of the total.
These three age groups, 45 and older, thus represent 89% of the total change in working population, while they account for just over half (52%) of the total working age population.

Alternatively, we can examine this phenomenon by simply looking at the participation rates, shown in the chart. Statically, there is a significant drop in participation when a person moves from the 45-54 yrs to the next age bracket- the rate differential is 15.7 percentage points (from 79.3% to 63.6%). This means that the number of people in the labor force will drop by 15.7% over the next decade simply by the number of people in the 45-54 group who fall now in the 55-64 group. And the drop is more dramatic for the 65 yrs and older, the change in rte is nearly 45 percentage points. Again, this means that simply due to aging, in a year nearly half of the persons who move to the next higher age bracket will fall out of the labor force. There is virtually nothing that can be done about this trend- it's a demographic factor.

But Rates Are Dropping Among Younger Population
The curious thing is that the declines in participation rates are occurring mostly among the younger population. That is, persons under 45 years of age are the ones leaving (or not joining) the labor force. We find that, over the last 30 years, the younger a person is the more likely that he or she is leaving the labor force. Thus we see that for those aged 20 to 24 years the participation rate has fallen by 8.4 percentage points since 1985.

In contrast, we find that older people are bucking this trend, they are in general becoming more active in the labor force. One reason for this phenomenon is the fact that people are healthier today, live longer and have more productive years, and are capable to work when they are older- very likely they enjoy work. A second reason is economic necessity; there is a large number of people at retirement or near retirement age who do not have sufficient funds and thus are forced to work. Many of them may have lost their homes or savings in the financial crisis.
It is interesting to note that more people 70 years and older are joining the labor force. The participation rate for both men and women in that age group has increased by around five percentage points over the last 30 years. One would like to say that they enjoy working so much they've returned to the labor force, but it's more likely they are doing so out of sheer economic necessity. (The chart displays separately the data for men and women 70 years and older, this is because we don't have readily available the combined figure, although we know that it is around five.)

If participation rates had remained at their 1985 levels we would have today nearly 2 million fewer in the labor force- 155.7 million at the '85 rates compared to 157.5 million actual. But the mix is radically different; we would have nearly 7 million more in the labor force who are younger than 45 years and, conversely, about 8.9 million in the 45 and over age group. The more younger people are in the labor force, the greater promise of larger economic output in the future (younger people have more working years in their future naturally) and paying more to many government pension plans, such as Social Security at the Federal level, that depend on the ongoing contribution from working people to remain viable.

So the more relevant figure to discuss is 32 million, rather than the touted 93 million. Thirty two million is the number of people under 45 years of age who are not in the labor force. That is, who for one reason or another are not interested in joining the labor force and becoming productive members of the U.S. economy.

Monday, November 30, 2015

CHANGES IN U.S. MANUFACTURING

Aside from the persistent and important question of manufacturing job losses in the U.S., and whether these losses can be regained or at least stopped, it may be instructive to see the changes in the manufacturing industry's structure over the last 20 years or so. Changes in the structure, regardless of the job losses, have an impact on the average wages paid in the sector and, thus, impact the incomes of U.S. consumers.

As I pointed out in an earlier post in this blog, manufacturing shipments have been relatively robust. Overall they have followed a positive trend, of course allowing for declines associated with economic recessions. Since 1992 shipments have doubled, translating into a 4.4% annual growth rate.
However, during this same period prices measured by the GDP Implicit Price Deflator rose by slightly over 50%; that is a 2.4% annual rate. After deflating the shipments data we find that the 4.4% annual growth is only 1.3% in real terms. Naturally, applying such a broad price measure does not give an accurate measure because price inflation varies among industries. Case in point is the sharp drop in petroleum and natural gas over the last couple of years, a decline that did not result in similar price reductions in other industries that depend in oil products.

Changes in Industry Structure
Since 1992 there have been several important changes in the structure of manufacturing, as one would expect. An economy is not a static entity but, rather, is one in which change is prevalent. At the micro level, old factories close and new factories spring up, production in individual factories goes up and down depending on the whims of consumers who may want more or less of the products made by those factories. At the macro level, we see new industries being born making products that nobody may have thought of up to that point, event though many make claims to it, or we see whole industries lose significance or disappear altogether.

The chart to the right compares 21 broad manufacturing sectors in 1992 and 2015, where we use shipments data through September for each of the years. The charts allow us to see two types of changes. One is in the percentage of manufacturing accounted by each sector, such as the 1.4 percentage points gained by Transportation Equipment (that includes autos, trucks, aircrafts, etc.) or by the Food sector.
The second type of change is the relative ranking of the various sectors within manufacturing- these changes are indicated by the green and red arrows and they highlight significant changes. Such is the case of Petroleum and Coal that, unsurprisingly, jumped to number four with 5.1 percentage point increase in share. At the same time we see sectors such as Computer and Electronics that fell three places to number seven with a 3.4 percentage point decline. Although I am not investigating causes for these declines, one can surmise that this reflects production shifted to overseas locations for cost considerations.
The good thing is that four out of the top five manufacturing sectors, that account for nearly half of manufacturing shipments, are also among the ones with the highest hourly earnings; the exception is Food Products Manufacturing with workers in this sector earning 24% below the average hourly manufacturing wage.

Manufacturing Losing Ground
Compared to other industries within the U.S. economy we find that manufacturing is not keeping up in general with overall growth in the economy. In terms of total output, manufacturing accounted for over one quarter of the output of all private industries in 1997 (the earliest year for which we have data). By last year, the share of manufacturing had fallen to just over a fifth of gross output.
Some of the decline in manufacturing is due to the long-term shift towards increased reliance on services. For instance, health services is an area where usage has increased, as shown by the two percentage points increase in the charts to the right. An given Obamacare's mandates, we should expect health's share of gross output to increase further in the next few years.




Wednesday, November 18, 2015

HOUSING STARTS AND EMPLOYMENT

Is there a relationship or link between new jobs and housing starts? Economic reasoning would logically lead you to answer positively- the greater number of people who get a job, the more likely some of them would purchase a new home. Of course this is all contingent on other factors such as the availability of vacant housing, ability to get a mortgage, and a growing population, to name a few. That is, any direct link between new jobs and new housing is constrained by demographic and other factors.

However, the search for a way of predicting the course of new housing starts led some economists, a few years ago, to posit a fixed or constant relationship between new jobs and housing starts. They sought and came up with a constant value that could be used as a rule of thumb to calculate how many new houses we should expect given the growth in employment. Today I examine whether such a constant does in fact exist or can be calculated meaningfully. I do this analysis at two levels; first at the national level looking at aggregate data that we normally see on a day to day, and then using the less commonly seen metropolitan area. Does such a relationship hold?

U.S. New Jobs and Housing Starts
At the national level we find that the ratio of new jobs to starts hovers somewhere between zero and three, ignoring those periods when employment falls in negative territory. A simple mathematical average using data from 1960 on, a calculation that one can always do with numbers even if the result is totally meaningless, shows the ratio for the U.S. equal to 1.1. Taking this number as a rule would mean that a new job translates into a slightly more than a new housing start. Applying this ratio to the number of new jobs between 2010 and 2014 results in over eight million housing starts driven by the new jobs created. But in fact, over this five year period, there were 3.9 million new houses started, and not eight million as the ratio suggests.

In reality, as a visual inspection of the graph to the right clearly shows, there is no stable ratio value. The blue line is the annual ratio of new jobs to housing starts going back to 1960. The red line reflects the 1.1 average over all those years (I excluded the years since 2008.) The way the blue line fluctuates around the average red line shows that the average does not carry much predictive power. In many years it underestimates the ratio and, conversely for others the ratio is overestimated; the size of the discrepancy is of an order of magnitude of more than two. One can only conclude that if indeed employment growth leads to new housing construction, we can't say with any degree of confidence how large or small the impact will be; that is, how many housing starts we should expect from employment growth alone.

Is there a ratio for MSAs?
We find that the relationship new jobs to starts is even more tenuous at the local level. We examined data for the ten largest metropolitan areas in the U.S. based upon the number of housing permits; we are using housing permits instead of starts, since the latter are not readily available for metropolitan areas.

A review of these data, graphed on the right, shows that there is not a consistent pattern for these metropolitan areas. In fact, the opposite seems to be true, there is great variation both within and between metro areas. Following any single line, for instance looking at the top line that is Los Angeles, we can see that the ratio ranges from 5 to 11- a huge difference. Also looking at the values for a given year, say 2011, we can see large differences between metro areas. The ratio can range from a low of around 3 for Atlanta to nearly 10 for New York. Thus there is not an accurate rule of thumb that we can use given there is not a stable value that can be used for any of these metro areas.

All of this simply shows that suggesting a specific number of housing starts given the growth in new jobs is close to economic nonsense. It is correct to say that more jobs will likely lead to more housing starts, the same that it will lead to more automobile sales or any other consumer product. People work because they want to buy stuff. However to say that X number of new jobs will produce exactlyY housing starts is a totally false statement.